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The purpose of this thesis is to examine the industrial
structure in oil spill clean-up activity. The study
concludes that the commercial sector, the forerunner in
clean-up activity, is being supplemented with private, or
in-house capability as well as non-profit and public
clean-up. However each sector remains a viable part of the
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!• INTRODUCTION
Since the late SC^s enviromental issues such as clean
air, clean water, recycling *ast€S-.
, *?tc have become a
frequent topic of discussion. Such interest has been
confined to no one particular geographical area or age
group, but spans interested individuals and larger special
interest groups and from the political arena to various
regulatory governmental agencies. This enviromental
interest is wide spread and influences many aspects of our
daily lives. Pollution has become a buzzword in almost
everyone's vocabulary. Even the terms "environment" and
"ecology" are now used in the names of local organizations,
as well as some state and federal agencies. l Recently
an environmental theme has been used by several large
organizations in advertisement as a reflection of this
increased interest. 2
As a result of enviromental awareness of the 60's
voluminious literature has been generated on the optimum
level of pollution control. The purpose of this paper is
not to add to the existing literature on the optimum level
of pollution control, but rather to examine in some detail
one industry actually engaged in pollution control -- the
Oil Spill Clean-up Industry.
It is not the intention of the author to present a
critique of the clean-up methodology or the strengths and
weaknesses of past clean-up, but rather to discuss the
development, economic aspects, and present status of the
industry. A majority of the information on which this study
*An example of a few aqencies are: Enviromental
Protection Agency (EPA) , Washinaton State Deaparment of
Ecology, Monterey Center for Enviromental Information.
2 Exxon Advertisement, NBC Nightly News on 20 November
1974; Coors Beer, "Cash for Cans" advertisement.

is based was gathered by the author from individual clean-up
firms with the purpose of developing characteristics of the
industry and not of any one particaiai firm. Much of this
information is confidential. Therefore where reference is
made towards characteristics of a firm as a part of the
industry, the identity of that firm will not be disclosed.
My sincere thanks goes to all the firms which have so
willingly contributed specific financial data and other
information upon which this study is based. Without such




Profit is perhaps the fundamental motive behind the
operation of any private business firm and thus for the
industry comprised of like firms. Profits are so
fundamental that they will not only determine whether a firm
will enter a given industry or market, but also the extent
of activity in the market.
For most firms, revenue is a measure of its activity
most often thought of in terras of gross sales. The gross
sales an industry can generate depends on the demand for the
product or service of that industry. Excess demand for a
product of an already established industry will drive up the
price and cause new firms to enter the industry. A change
in technology or in consumer preferences which creates
demand for an entirely new product will cause either an
already established industry to transfer resources to its
production or cause formation of a new industry to meet the
demand.
The demand for the output of a new industry is never
known with complete certainty. At least some degree of
"demand uncertainty" is present in every industry, but the
extent of demand uncertainty varies from industry to
industry. For some industries such as the baking industry
demand for the product, i.e. bread, can be predicted with a
high degree of confidence. Other industries are able to
predict with only with low certainty the demand for output
due to the nature of the product. In addition to the
absolute demand being uncertain, the freguency with which
the demand for services or product is encountered can also
be uncertain. Many industries such as the building
materials industry are subject to fluctuating demand within
a fiscal period. If the fluctuations are truly seasonal
they can be predicted with accuracy once the causes are
understood. But if fluctuations exist for which the causes
are random, true demand uncertainty exists.

A firm faced with uncertain demand both in respect to
total demand and frequency of demand over time, might be
compared to the local firehouse where the capability is
maintained to cope with uncertain demand. The Oil Spill
Clean-up Industry is similar to the firehouse because of the
uncertain demand resulting from the random nature of oil
spills. A prevalant feeling among the firms presently
offering clean-up service is that this demand is random. As
one member of the industry stated, "You can never tell when
there will be a spill. You can go five or six weeks without
a spill and then have five or six in one week". This
situation of uncertain demand for firms attempting to offer
oil spill clean-up services will be defined by the author as
the "firehouse dilemma".
It might be asked then, that if demand is so uncertain
why should any firm interested in making a profit attempt to
enter the Oil Spill Clean-up Industry. A guick review of
the spills in recent years reveals such massive clean-up
efforts as the TORREY CANYON off the coast of England in
1965 with a clean-up cost of $ 8 million, the Santa Barbara
spill in 1969 with a cost of clean-up in excess of $ 5
million dollars, and the Standard Oil Tanker collision in
San Francisco Bay in 1970 with a clean-up cost of $ 5
million. These examples point out the magnitude of demand
for clean-up capability when a large or catastrophic spill
occurs. In the event of such a spill the potential for huge
profits definitely exists.
A high potential for profit from such large spills
attracted resources from various sources into research and
development for pollution abatement and clean-up equipment.
Many small inventors and manufacturers attempted to develop
equipment which would allow them to capitalize on the
ecology movement. Likewise the lure of profits encouraged
some firms to develop an inventory of equipment and provide
oil spill clean-up services.
Outside the industry there exists a feeling that a

lucrative new market exists, and that anyone with a bale of
hay and a pitchfork could make his fortune cleaning up oil
spills. To date the limited number of firms having entered
the industry in any given area indicates that views of such
lucrative profits are probably not valid.
The purpose of this paper therefore is to analyze the
structure of the industry with emphasis given to the extent
of uncertainty within the industry, and how at least





IV« DEFINITION OF THE INDUSTRY
The Oil Spill Clean-up Industry under consideration for
this study can best be described as all organizations or
firms on the West Coast of the United States which actively
maintain a capability to clean-up oil or other hazardous
substances from the surface of the water. To accurately
examine the industry, all firms which have the capability of
clean-up but do not advertise or offer clean-up on a
commercial basis, i.e. which are not commonly thought of as
a clean-up firm, must also be included. All sources of
clean-up are considered part of the clean-up industry.
However, since such an all inclusive definition of the
industry includes entities with diverse purposes, intended
uses of clean-up capability, and markets, the aggregrate
industry might better be broken down into four sectors: the
commercial, the private, the non-profit and the government
sector.
The commercial sector of the clean-up industry
considered for the purpose of this study comprises those
nine firms on the West Coast which offer their services to
any party interested in purchasing clean-up activity. A
list of the firms in the commercial sector is included as
Appendix A. Determination of the firms which make up this
sector was based on recent clean-up activity as observed by
government regulatory agencies. The commercial sector can
be categorized as those firms offering clean-up for hire.
The private clean-up sector differs from the commercial
clean-up sector in that clean-up capability is maintianed
primarily for the "in-house" benefit of that firm, not for
hire by other parties. This sector would include firms as
small as private marinas desiring some clean-up capability,
or firms as large as refineries frequently handling great
volumes of petroleum products.
The non-profit sector consists solely of the oil spill
clean-up cooperatives. The six cooperatives on the West
11

Coast which are listed in Appendix B vary as to the exact
structure or the extent of capability, but all are a pooled
effort of firms susceptible to oil spillage. This sector
represents a different source of clean-up capability than
the private sector, but it can be described as an extension
of. the private sector where some but not all the firms in
the private sector have pooled their effort beyond their
individual capability to provide protection in the event of
a catastrophic spill.
Public sector capability maintained by the federal and
state government is the fourth group of the Oil Spill
Clean-up Industry. The majority of public clean-up
capability presently comes from the U. S. Navy and the U. S.
Coast Guard. State assistance by Washington, Oregon and
California in terms of physical clean-up capability is at
present non-existant.
For the clean-up industry, as defined, the basic
question remains of how fixed costs are met with
intermittent revenues. This question of costs and revenue
has most emphasis within the commercial sector offering
clean-up services for hire. For these firms commercial
clean-up provides revenue and hopefully profit. Profit from
clean-up activity has little or no direct impact on the
other sectors of the industry. As an example a firm in the
private sector maintains clean-up capability to take action
on a spill originating from its own facility. Clean-up
equipment for the private firm then is primarily an expense
within the operation of a specific facility. It is one of
the costs of doing business. The non-profit sector is
prohibited by law from making a profit, but revenue is often
received by the cooperatives to cover both the capital and
operating expense of the cooperative and its equipment. The
government does not maintain clean-up capability under a
profit incentive, yet under certain circumstances revenue




The initial examination of the clean-up industry and the
"firehouse dilemma" of uncertain demand best originates in
the commercial sector where profit is a primary factor.
13

Ill* HISTORY OF THE OIL SPILL CLEAN-UP INDUSTRY
Historical information concerning both the spillage and
the clean-up of oil is quite sketchy and not well
documented. Indications are that oil spills occurred in the
form of natural seepage long before man started to use
petroleum products as a source of energy. Such seepage
originated from fissures in the ocean floor, much the same
as the recent Santa Barbara spill but caused solely by
nature. Evidence of early seepage is substantiated by
archaeologists at the University of California, Santa
Barbara who have found indications that burial baskets for
the Sumach Indians were lined with oil from the beaches. In
fact it is rumored that word of oil seepages brought people
from the East Coast to Santa Barbara for the therapeutic
value of the warm ocean breeze blowing in off the oil seeps.
Thus it is conjecture that the first clean-up on the West
Coast was by ancient California natives gathering tar balls
off the beach as a source of material or fuel.
Mass production of the internal combustion engine and
increased demands for petroleum products at the turn of the
century changed not only man's lifestyle but also his
environment. The gradual shift of vessel propulsion from
sail and then coal to petroleum, compounded by the increased
transportation of oil by ship was accompanied by an increase
in the spillage and intentional discharge of oil into
harbors and coastal waters.
Since the Rivers and harbors Act of 1899, statutes have
existed which prohibited such spillage. The 1899 law was
mainly to forbid the discharge or deposits of materials into
the waterways that would be hazardous to navigation, but
this act also possessed authority to prohibit oil spills.
It wasn't until the Oil Pollution Act of 1924 that a law was
enacted which specifically prohibited the discharge of oil.
But even this 1924 law said nothing about the responsibility
14

of picking up the oil once it was spilled, it merely
prohibited the spilling of oil.
Historically the spillage of oil products was of concern
to the spiller not for reasons of environmental protection,
but rather for reasons of economics and safety. Spilled
material was material which could not be sold. The presence
of volatile fumes from spilled material in the harbor also
provided the threat of fire to the facilities and a health
hazard to personnel.
The early treatment of spills differed for the various
ports on the West Coast. Most ports such as Seattle,
Portland and San Francisco required no concentrated clean-up
effort because the natural dissipation and evaporation of
spilled oil was sped up by the flushing of normal tidal
action or currents. Other ports such as Long Beach had less
tidal action and some action had to be taken to remove the
oil. Often when action was taken it was not a clean-up for
environmental reasons but rather a matter of removing the
oil so work could go on as usual.
The first indication of concerted clean-up on the West
Coast was in California around 1934 when the California
State Fish and Game Department took an active interest in
clean-up. Prior to that time spills went unattended. There
was no record of any clean-up taken when the LEHMAN STUART,
a Union Oil tanker, went aground at the Golden Gate in 1927.
Likewise when the AMERICAN HAWAIIAN ran aground at Point
Mugu, just north of Los Angeles in the late 1920's all the
fuel was dumped overboard with no consideration given to the
oil, just to lighten the ship and get her off.
As early as 1931 public concern developed against oil
pollution. The Los Angeles Times reported a meeting of an
association, "Save The Beaches League", which met at Long
Beach in October of that year to carry on an offensive
against pollution. The purpose of the league was "to make
investigations and recommendations, obtain legislation
15

and enforcement and call general meetings to plan the
offensive against oil pollution". 3
The thrust against pollution of the beaches was directed
mainly against the prevention of spillage not towards the
clean-up of subseguent spilled oil probably because of the
lack of clean-up techniques. Awareness of the problem was
becomming acute and policies towards intentional dumping
were being reviewed. As reported by a newspaper article in
1931, "Commander E. H. Bruce told how the Navy coDperates by
requiring all discharges to be made at least 15 miles
offshore often dumping ballast waters 100 miles off shore to
protect the beaches." 4
In one west coast port clean-up equipment was developed
in the early thirties. The first clean-up vessel on the
west coast was at Long Beach in the early thirties owned by
William Hutchison and William Simpson in an enterprise
called Western Ship Service Company Ltd. The vessel, the
PASADENA , was a converted lumber schooner which had been
equipped with $50,000 worth of tanks, pumps and mechanisims
which separate floating oil from water. Although the
PASADENA was designed for ship service, it was also capable
of oil spill clean-up. A newspaper clipping for the Los
Angeles Times of an unspecified date in the early thirties
held what is perhaps the earliest record of clean-up on the
west coast when it reported, "the vessel (PASADENA) was in
operation at the Bethlehem Shipyards, where oil from the
damaged hull of the CFARCAS had run onto the water."
The early clean-up efforts demonstrated at Long Beach
were not typical for the west coast. As late as 1937 when
the Associated Oil Company tanker, FRANK BUCK went aground
on Ducks Burry Reef just outside the Golden Gate not too
3 "Southland To Wage War on Beach Oil Pollution", Los




far from where the Standard tanker collision took place 34
years later, no clean-up action was taken.
Early clean-up required only minimum equipment and
technical knowhow, and was most often accomplished with the
existing equipment and manpower of the firm which had
spilled. Fire hoses and the vessels propeller wash, two
implements readily available to the spiller, were used to
flush the surface oil out into mid-stream or open, faster
moving water where natural dissipation would be accelerated.
Early clean-up was not a technical problem, but merely
an inconvenience necessary to resume business as usual. In
the mid-sixties environmental concern began to accelerate
and the previous practice of clean-out suddenly was no
*
longer acceptable. As small, special interest groups became
concerned, the general population began to demand a true
clean-up effort. Government reaction followed first by
reviving existing but unused legislation, and then by
rewriting legislation to better meet the current intent of
the government. A gradual transition occurred where the
individual spillers realized that previous techniques were
not acceptable to the general public or the government. In
1966, the Oil Pollution Act of 1924 was amended by Congress
to require violators to remove spilled oil from navigable
waters. If proper action was not taken to remove the oil,
the Federal Government was authorized to remove the oil and
seek reimbursements for clean-up costs. 5 Thorough clean-up
had to be accomplished where at all possible.
At first small changes were instituted. Straw as an
absorbent was substituted for the previously used carbonized
sand which was a sinking agent that would adhere to the oil
and sink to the bottom of the harbor. But soon it was
5 Hess, Richard E. , "Navy and Marine Oil Pollution -- An
EPA View", Navy Oil Spill Control Conference Proceedings,
1-4 May, 1972, ~p7 1T7
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discovered that a little straw, genuine concern and a few
boom sticks were not enough to efficiently remove the
spilled material from the water especially where large
quantities of oil were involved. Large firms realized they
could conduct some clean-up themselves by investing in some
relatively inexpensive equipment and utilizing company
personnel. But these companies desired a more efficient and
reliable method of clean-up. As a result a concerted R & D
effort was initiated for improved methods of oil clean-up.
Manufacturers and inventors were after a new a lucrative
market -- oil clean-up equipment.
Yet by 1970 a firm faced with a potential oil spill
clean-up problem had to decide whether to purchase equipment.
or rely on some outside source for clean-up. Although there
was a multitude of new products suddenly on the market, all
had varying capability, and potential consumers were unsure
which if any of the new devices would be worth the high
cost. Also with the rapid changes in technology, a firm was
reluctant to invest heavily in a clean-up system which soon
could have become obsolete. As a result of the complexities
of clean-up, most small firms and many large firms choose to
rely on an outside source for clean-up, if such assistance
should be needed. But few if any commercial firms existed
which could fulfill this demand for contracted clean-up.
Thus clean-up assistance came from commercial companies
which did not have a specialized clean-up capability, but
had equipment that could be substituted into service for oil
spill clean-up.
Initial clean-up devices consisted merely of log boom
for containment, small vessels to deploy and maintain the
boom, and an absorbent material which could be used to
retrieve the oil from the water. Tug and barge companies
often had the boom and vessels while an absorbent, straw,
could be picked up at any feed store. Tug companies did not
actively advertise or specialize in clean-up through the
late sixties. Their services could be requested by a firm
13

with a spill and the charge was the going rate for the
equipment. k major problem for these companies in
performing oil clean-up services was that the tugs were
usually slow, and thus the response time was high, for the
purpose of containing oil. The marine-industrial clean-up
companies had tank trucks and vacuum pumps for picking up
the waste oil and transporting it from the scene of the
spill to the disposal site. Again such companies were not
in the specific business of clean-up, they merely made their
services available, and the same problem of response time
existed. The increased demand to have oil spills cleaned up
in a prompt and efficient manner created the climate for the
specialized Oil Spill Clean-up firm.
19

V« THE COMMERCIAL SECTOR
The commercial sector comprised of the nine firms on the
West Coast offering oil spill clean-up for hire represents
companies which are most commonly thought of as "clean-up
firms". These firms are widely known throughout the
maritime industry as a source of assistance should an oil
spill occur. Additionally these are also the firms that
come into the public view as profitable operations in the
aftermath of a sizable spill when large clean-up costs are
reported
.
A* COMMERCIAL SECTOR DEMAND
Commercial clean-up demand is an expression of consumer
preference for the service of having oil cleaned up. Demand
must be considered in the context of a price-quantity
relationship. Normal demand, expressed by a downward
sloping demand curve, implies an increase in price will be
accompanied by some decrease in the quantity of the service
demanded. Such is assumed to be the case for commercial oil
spill clean-up. It might well be argued that for clean-up
in the short run the consumer is not in a position to ask
"how much", but must seek available services at any price.
In practice however the commercial price for clean-up is a
result of what consumers are willing to pay to commercial
firms rather than seek some other source of clean-up. The
techniques of cleaning up oil lend themselves to a high rate
of substitutabiiity in that if the prices of one clean-up
process are too high, then another technique will be
employed. If clean-up firms were to raise prices to an
excessive level, demand for commercial clean-up would tend
to fall.
An example of one market where substitutabiiity is not a
factor is the "spot tanker market". This includes all
tankers which are not on a long time charter but rather
charge the market rate to haul petroleum products. The
relationship of demand and supply is so critical in this
20

market that only a few too many ships in an area such as the
Persian Gulf can drastically lower the transportation rates
for petroleum. If there are too few ships in the same area
the rate does climb rapidly. Rates which are calculated on
a world scale index (to equalize the revenue per ton per
day) rose during a three week period in May of 1973 from
92.5 to 210. 6 No close substitue exists for tankers, while
commercial oil spill ciean-up has very close substitutes.
1. Past Activity as a Measure of Demand
Commercial clean-up dsmand can be considered in terms of
the past activity or the amounts of clean-up supplied by
commercial clean-up firms. An initial step to evaluate past
supply as an approximation of demand is to isolate a measure
of activity common to all clean-up incidents. Items
considered as a possible measure of activity were one or
several of the following parameters: number of spills
cleaned up, number of gallons cleaned up, gross revenue
(sales) from clean-up operations.
Either the total number of spills which occur or the
number cleaned up in a year (see Figure 1 and 2) would be
one measure of activity. Although these measures would
suggest the frequency with which the commercial sector is
activated, it would not accurately describe the magnitude of
the spill or the clean-up required. Total gallons spilled
more accurately represents the actual magnitude of clean-up
than the number of spills, but a gallon figure can also be
misleading as a true indication of clean-up effort required.
The type of oil spilled and the conditions under which it
was spilled such as currents, weather, etc., are factors
often just as important as the total gallons spilled in
determining the total clean-up activity.
An optimal indicator of activity would jointly consider
the number of spills, the magnitude of the spill by total
6 Beman, Lewis, "Betting $ 20 Billion in th'




gallons, the type of oil, and in addition any other factors
which add to the difficulty of clean-up. An all inclusive
model to develop such a figure is not feasable due to the
lack of data required on past spills and clean-up attempts.
An assumption can be made which will enable just one
indicator, gross revenue attributed to clean-up, to be
utilized as a measure which combines the favorable points of
these other parameters considered. The assumption is that
oil spill clean-up rates are comparable throughout the
industry for any given spill cleaned up by any of the nine
firms. Comparable rates means that all spills generating an
equal revenue, for example $10,000, to a clean-up firm are
placing an equal demand on the commercial clean-up sector.
Even though faults may exist with revenue as a measure
of activity, no other measure which will approach revenue as
a common indicator is available. 7 Because gross revenue is
by far the most accurate indicator readily available it will
be used in this study to describe the clean-up activity.
1. Actual Commercial Clean-up Demand
The actual demand for commercial clean-up service on the
West Coast presently is approximately $2.6 million a year.
An accurate description of how this demand is distributed
throughout the industry requires the industry be looked at
in geographical regions and the demand in these regions be
examined over a period of time.
The location of commercial clean-up firms is presently
distributed between the following five major ports:
Seattle, Portland, San Francisco Bay, Los Angeles/Long Beach
and San Diego. Location of several firms in one port and
the mutual proximity of several of these ports enables the
West Coast to be discussed in terms of three geographical
70ne such fault is that spills with the same total
revenue might differ greatly in the amount of clean-up and
restoration. Since beach clean-up and yacht restoration are
not functions of the clean-UD industry, this would tend to




regions. The Pacific Northwest Region represents the coast
of Washington and the northern coast of Oregon. Likewise
the Central Coast Region includes southern Oregon plus
northern and central California. The Southern California
Region encompasses the area including Santa Barbara, Los
Angeles, Long Beach, and San Diego. Each of these three
regions contains three commercial clean-up firms. Table I.
represents the activity in these three respective regions
for the two and one half year period covered by this study.
As can be readily seen from Table I. there was an
increase in total demand in 1973 over the demand for
clean-up for 1972. But partial explanation for this
increase is due to a moderate spill that occured in the
Central Coast Region and another sizable spill in the
Northwest Region. A large spill in any year for any given
geographical location will effect the total revenue from
clean-up by as much as 50 to 100 percent. For example in
the Northwest Region in 1973 one spill which involved the
effort of two commercial firms and with clean-up lasting
more than three weeks accounted for 59 percent of the total
clean-up activity for the three clean-up firms in the
region. One spill out of 96 clean-up operations for the
Northwest Region accounted for over half of the total
revenue from 1973. For the Central Coastal Region one spill
accounted for 48 percent of the total activity of the same
year.
Neither of the above mentioned spills were considered
"catastrophic" in the sense of the TORREY CANY3N spill or
even the Santa Barbara spill, but rather were classed as
moderate. The two and one half year period of this study
was chosen for the purpose of representing a period
considered as a normal demand range. It was purposely
chosen so as not to include the Santa Barbara spill or the
Standard tanker collision in San Francisco Bay. This
enabled the study to examine how the industry behaves when





Annual Gross Clean-up Revenue
1972 1973 1974(6Mo)
Northwest 170,086 754,865 236,364
Central Coast 617,922 921,684 163,454
Southern Cal 605,198 925,422 796,933
Total 1,393,206 2,601,971 1,196,751




spill will drastically effect the observed activity for the
commercial sector which has been measured in terms of
revenue.
A segmented look at past deraana In terms of minor,
moderate and major spills will place into prospective the
impact of these infrequent large spills. The breakdown of
spills into three segments will be based on the revenue of
the individual clean-up. A "minor" spill is established as
an individual spill with a gross revenue under $35,000, a
"moderate" spill between $35,000 and $500,000, while a
"major" spill is over $500,000 in clean-up costs. The
division between the major and moderate spill is strictly
arbitrary, as any spill moderate or larger may completely
bias the demand figures for the whole West Coast.
To substantiate this division of minor to moderate
spills a frequency distribution of various sized spills has
been developed. Table 2 shows the distribution of 400
spills as a representative sample of total spills. This
data includes all clean-up incidents encountered by thrae of
the nine commercial firms for the two and one half year
period of the study. Table 2 clearly demonstrates that a
large majority of the clean-up incidents are small in
nature. It is seen that 81.8 percent of all spills cleaned
up are in the $1,000 to $5,000 range, where as spills over
$35,000 for the same period represent only 2 percent of the
number of spills. However when the total revenue is
considered for all clean-up incidents within a given
clean-up size category, it is seen that total revenue is not
so heavily dependent upon the small sized spills. As an
example the 81.8 percent of all clean-up incidents which
were less than $5,000 accounted for only 27.7 percent of the
total revenue for these three firms. It is also of interest
to note from table 2 that all minor spills with a clean-up
revenue under $35,000 accounted for 97.9 percent of the






by Frequency and Revenue Size










Source: Total of 400 clean-up incidents for three firms
1972,1973, and first six months 1974.
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Such strong dependence on the minor spills by the
commercial sector suggests that any demand anticipation by
these firms would be placed primarily on the minor spills
with little dependence being given to the moderate and major
types of spills. A two-part measure of demand for all nine
firms can be constructed by separating out the minor spills
from the moderate and major spills. This is represented in
Table 3. By segmenting demand into the two parts, the
original "firehouse dilemma" of uncertain demand can better
be analyzed in terms of the commercial sector.
Any spill of the moderate or larger clean-up effort can
be demonstrated to be a "highly uncertain" occurance, and
hence will be considered with only little weight by the
commercial firm. Conversely the aggregation of minor spills
reflects a relatively smooth and certain demand one adjusted
by deleting the larger spills.
B» THE COMMERCIAL CLEAN-DP FIRM
No typical commercial clean-up firm exists. The nine
firms on the West Coast vary not only in the total size of
the firm but also in the extent and type of clean-up
eguipment available. As a result firms also vary as to
capabity and the exact type of clean-up best performed.
Often differences betweeen individual firms are a result of
regional features such as the type of harbor, commerce in
that area, and what type of spills commonly required
clean-up in the past. Such differences between firms are
subjective to the extent that no optimal size or capability
appears to have been determined on an industry wide basis.
The nine commercial clean-up firms have at present a total
clean-up inventory in excess of $ 1.3 million. This
includes approximately 12,000 feet of assorted containment
booms and sevenself-propelled skimmers.
1 • Multi-functional Firm
Common to all clean-up companies is the
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in the industry have one or more revenue generating
activities Seme of these additional functions are related to
environmental protection other than the service of cleaning
up an oil spill. The characteristics of the "other"
functions are not common throughout the industry.
Activities in the commercial firms along with clean-up
include the following: marine-industrial cleaning,
pollution prevention, pollution control equipment
manufacturing and sales, and tug and barge service.
a. Marine-Ndustrial Cleaning Service
The marine-industrial cleaning industry consists
of tank cleaning and waste removal operations for all types
of vessels and manufacturing firms. Equipment required in
this operation includes tank trucks with vacuum suction
capability, cleaning components, pumps, waste transfer and
sometimes waste disposal capability. Firms offering the
marine-industrial cleaning service are found in all major
West Coast industrial centers and ports. The local economic
conditions including the extent of shipping, oil refining,
oil storage, chemical processing, etc., determine the size
of the marine-industrial cleaning capability of any given
area. Through, the nature of the work performed and the
equipment utilized, marine-industrial cleaning is extremely
compatible with oil spill clean-up.
b. Tug and Barge Service
Tug and barge companies involved either in
harbor ship services or in long distance barge
transportation provide numerous vessels or other mobile
platforms from which to conduct oil clean-up. The
organizational structure of these companies with 2 4 hour
dispatch and continuous harbor activity also make this type
of firm highly compatible with oil spill clean-up,
c. Pollution Prevention Service
Oil spill prevention and reduction is a service
which closely parallels but yet is separate from clean-up.
Prevention and reduction of oil spills consists of
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activities such as pre-deployment of boom or oil containment
systems, or an on-scene standby capability to minimize
damage if a spill should occur. Such services are not
designed so much with the absolute prevention of spills but
rather with the reduction or minimization of clean-up once a
spill should occur.
Preventive services differ from actual clean-up
in that oil is not on the water. A clean cut difference
between prevention charges and clean-up charges does not
exist if a spill occurs. Once a spill occurs prevention
becomes the initial phase of clean-up. If a spill does
occur while prevention service is in use, the pre-deployed
boom automatically contains the oil while any standby
eguipment can be put to immediate clean-up use. There is no
great time delay for transportation and thus clean-up
efforts are not hampered by the loss and dissipation of oil.
A major difference is that pure oil spill clean-up activity
is more uncertain than prevention-reduction service which
has a clean-up demand based on the activity for which
pre-deployed or standby capability is required.
This service is directed towards a clientele
which possess a high probability of spilling. The on scene
or pre-deployed system can result in enormous savings by
reduction of necessary clean-up and pollution should a spill
occur. Where no spill occurs this prevention service cannot
be included as clean-up activity. Thus the need for a
separate category of "prevention service".
d. Pollution Equipment Manufacturing and Sales
Manufacturing of pollution clean-up equipment
includes such items as containment booms, absorbents,
various pick-up devices for the retrieval of oil and oil
soaked debris, or other equipment for clean-up. Retail
sales of equipment manufactured or of equipment purchased
from manufacturers also is compatible with pollution
abatement but is still a separate activity.
Numerous manufacturers and distributors of oil
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spill clean-up equipment have no clean-up capability to be
offered as a service. That is many equipment manufacturers
are not faced with the demand for clean-up, but merely the
demand for clean-up equipment. These two demands represent
different markets and are not necessarily correlateed.
Sales revenue is qeared to the level of protection thought
necessary throughout all sectors of the Oil Spill Clean-up
Industry. Commercial clean-up activity is dependent upon
the actual occurance and size of spills for which commercial
clean-up is required. The level of protection and therefore
sales might even be inversely related to demand for
commercial clean-up services if it represents a shift from
commercial to private or non-profit clean-up.
2. Clean-up Dependence
Economic interest in the commercial clean-up sector
is directed toward the dependence of commercial firms on
clean-up as a source of revenue. The dependence of a firm
on clean-up for revenue measures the importance of being
able to predict demand for clean-up and the consequences of
facing random demand. If it represents only a small portion
of a given firm's activity and that same firm has relatively
few resources devoted entirely to clean-up, the consequences
of random demand are minimal. If a sizable portion of one
firm's income depends on clean-up, and a large share of the
plant and equipment of that firm is devoted solely to
clean-up then consequences of random demand are vital.
This author has established an arbitrary
classification of the firms based on their clean-up
dependence. To differentiate between those firms dependent
or relatively independent of clean-up the terms "pure" and
"secondary" have been introduced to describe the clean-up
firm. This classification has nothing to do with the
overall capability of the firm in clean-up activity, but is
used only to describe the dependence of a firm on clean-up
activity for revenue as a part of total sales.
An arbitrary breakoff point between a "pure" firm
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and a "secondary" firm will categorize a firm as pure if
more that half of the firm's total revenue is derived from
clean-up activity. Such a low breakoff point initially
suggests that even a pure firm is not completely dependent
on clean-up. It should be noted that environmental
protection related activities such as pollution reduction,
pollution equipment manufacturing or sales are not included
in the category of clean-up activity for the determination
of whether a firm is pure or secondary. This category of
pure versus secondary firm deals solely with oil spill
clean-up as a percentage of total revenue, not from clean-up
related activities. Thus firms which deal with clean-up
related activities in addition to clean-up are not favored
in the sense of being a pure firm.
Of immediate interest is the fact that only three of
the nine firms included in the commercial sector qualify as
pure firms. Clean-up dependence for the individual firm
ranges from a high of 100 percent to a low of .9 percent for
any of the two and one half years. r'or the entire clean-up
sector the dependence on clean-up was 27.5 percent for the
entire period. Within individual firms the dependence on
clean-up changed from 1972 to 1973 and 1974. The three
firms designated as pure decreased in dependence each year.
These three firms remained in the pure category for 1972 and
1973 but for the first six months of 1974 only one of these
firms was still pure. Of the secondary firms one gained in
dependence each year while the others had a higher
dependence in 1973 than either 1974 or 1972. This increased
dependence in 1973 is partially a result of several moderate
spills occurring in that period. With the exception of
these moderate spills the tendency for all the secondary
firms was to increase slightly in dependence for 1973 with
1974 generally being lower than 1972.
There was an increased tendency by the three pure
firms to rely more on their clean-up related functions such
as pollution equipment manufacturing, sales and prevention
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services in the later years. Over the three year period the
pure firms remained almost entirely in pollution related
fields. But the specific dependence <a: clean-up activity
declined with the increased vertical integration into
various phases of clean-up related functions.
Relatively low dependence on clean-up throughout the
industry suggests the commercial sector as originally
specified is not pure in the economic sense. When an
industry (such as the baking or the steel industry) deals
basically with a single function, the industry can be
analyzed in terms of the one basic product or service. The
commercial clean-up industry does not fall into this simple,
clear-cut category, and can better be described as a
collection of multi-product firms all sharing at least one
common product, oil spill clean-up.
Although a discussion of the proper classification
of the commercial clean-up sector within different
industries might be of interest, the outcome is merely
academic. Commercial clean-up is a sizable and important
aspect of the overall clean-up industry. The existence of
the commercial sector therefore by definition must be
assumed to complete a study of the total Oil Spill Clean-up
Industry.
3- Multi-functional Characteristics of the Firm
One of the criteria which determines the type of
functions accompanying any particular clean-up firm is the
local economic conditions of the region. fin examination of
the multi-functional firms by different geographical regions
discloses the fact that a relationship does exist. Among
the three firms of the Northwest Region, one is a pure
clean-up firm, another a pollution equipment manufacturer
and distributor, and the third is an independent division of
a tug and barge operation. In the Central. Coastal Region
one of the three firms again is a pure c~lean-up firm with
associated functions of spill prevention and reduction as
well as equipment manufacturing. In the Southern California
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Region, all three firms are secondary The other two firms in
the Central Region have as a primary function
marine-industrial cleaning and associated services. and are
involved in the marine-industrial cleaning operation. The
geographical trend is apparent in the three different
regions. Two pure firms with little input from
marine-industrial cleaning are in the Northwest Region,
while conversely in the Southern California Region all firms
are secondary and have a common function of
marine-industrial cleaning as the primary activity.
This difference between the type of clean-up firm by
regions directly relates to the economic structure of the
region. A compilation of the Army Corps of Engineers,
waterborne commerce statistics show that Puget Sound ports
have handled 52.2 million barrels of petroleum products in
1972. Portland area including Astoria and the Columbia
River for the same period handled 59.6 million barrels. In
the other two regions, San Francisco Bay area handled 150.1
million barrels while Los Angeles/Long Beach and San Diego
handled 161.5 million barrels. While there are five
refineries in the Northwest region (all in Puget Sound) such
refineries are relatively spread out. As a result a
concentrated marine-industrial cleaning capability does not
exist, as contrasted with Southern California where a large
number of refineries are concentrated in relatively close
proximity. Of further signifigance is the number of wells
located in Southern California which also require
marine-industrial cleaning services.
Because of the differences in the size and
concentration of petroleum transfering, refining and storing
in the three West Coast Regions, there also exists a
difference in related industries such as marine-industrial
cleaning. The local economic conditions of Southern
California have supported the marine- industrial cleaning
industry which is extremely complimentary to the Oil Spill
Clean-up Industry. The transition to oil spill clean-up was
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natural with no large capital expenditures necesssary. With
different economic forces in the Central Coastal Region and
in the Northwest Region, a dxflerent approach to the
development of the clean-up firm was undertaken and greater
capital purchases had to be made.
It is because of these differences in economics of
the regions that two of the three firms in the Northwest
Region are pure firms, while all of the clean-up firms in
the Southern California Region are secondary and have
marine-industrial cleaning as their primary function.
C. SOLUTIONS TO THE FIREHOUSE DILEMMA
The acknowledgement of multi-product or multi-function
firms and a predominance of secondary firms in the
commercial sector points out an initial answer to the
guestion of how firms adjust to certain costs and stochastic
or uncertain revenue. Since the structure and clean-up
dependence for pure and secondary firms differ, the solution
of the "firehouse dilemma" for each might be examined
separately.
1 • Solution of the Secondary, Firms
The short run answer for secondary firms is that
costs of maintaining clean-up capability need not be matched
by revenues on a monthly or even a quarterly basis. Such
short periods of insufficient revenue might be sustained by
revenue from the major functions of the firm. Then for some
specified longer period, such as one or even two years,
revenue would be expected to not only exceed cost but carry
a reasonable profit including a risk premium. Over the long
run if revenues did not prove to carry cost, then it would
suggest that oil spill clean-up be dropped as a function of
that firm.
The secondary firms are relatively independent of
oil clean-up as a source of revenue so that any risk
associated with uncertain activity in oil clean-up can be
carried by the other functions. The spreading of risk is an
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approach all firms have taken, but secondary firms are far
better equipped to spread this risk among their major
activities.
Within the secondary firms there is a high
compatibility of the major activity to that of oil spill
clean-up. Other functions of the secondary firm are not
related to oil spill clean-up, but are functions such as
marine-industrial cleaning or tug and barge operations which
can easily adapt major equipment to an oil spill clean-up
function. This compatibility allows considerable
substitution of equipment from the primary activities of the
firm into oil clean-up. Rather than have specialized oil
spill clean-up equipment remain idle, secondary firms use
equipment which is adaptable to clean-up but is still
employed in the primary activity of the firm. Then when a
spill occurs the equipment is diverted from the lower
priority, normal function to the higher priority task of oil
spill clean-up. Thus an extensive inventory of specialized
clean-up equipment need not be kept on hand with a low
probability of use. Clean-up usually entails overtime which
represents an increased utilization and return on the
equipment. Lower priority use of the equipment can be
resumed once clean-up is complete.
The example of marine-industrial cleaning is a case
in point. Tank trucks, pumps, hoses etc., which normally
are used for industrial or marine cleaning can be converted
to oil spill clean-up with minimum adaptation. Tank trucks
which are scheduled to work forty hours a week can be
quickly transfered to oil spill clean-up with utilization of
trucks often far in excess of forty hours per week.
Within the secondary firms the feeling was prevelant
that clean-up was a source of "bonus revenue" because of the
added utilization of equipment. The other factor that
encouraged many of the secondary firms to continue offering
a clean-up service is that many customers served by the
major functions of the firm were also in need of spill
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clean-up from time to time. Thus offering clean-up service
by many of the secondary firms was a normal extension of
their existing service line.
A common characteristic of the secondary firm in
their approach to the oil spill clean-up service is the
reluctance to invest in extensive equpiment that could be
used only for clean-up. As a result the clean-up effort of
a secondary firm often closely parallels the major activity
with respect to method of clean-up. That is to say a
secondary firm specializing in marine-industrial cleaning
would be more inclined to use a fleet of tank trucks for
clean-up than to purchase a "class I skimmer" for harbor
clean-up efforts.
This relates to a revenue-effectiveness ratio for
different types of oil spill clean-up equipment. Secondary
firms are more inclined to use existing equipment for
clean-up to which they are already commited in their primary
activity. The rate charged for this equipment is the same
rate as when employed in a non clean-up activity regardless
of the comparative efficiency of the equipment to pick-up
oil. If the efficiency or capability of this
multi-functional equipment is less than another piece of
speciality equipment, usable only for clean-up but charging
the same rate, then the use of the multi-functional
equipment with a high revenue-effectiveness ratio would be
more costly for the party paying for the clean-up.
The above situation could work in reverse. The
charge for multi-functional equipment could be less than
specialty equipment because the fixed cost of the
multi-functional equipment is spread over clean-up and non
clean-up activities. If the lower cost is passed on to the
consumer, a lower revenue-effectiveness ratio may result,
depending on the efficiency comparisons. Firms passing on
such cost savings could perform more efficient clean-up to
the advantage of the party paying for clean-up.
Characteristics of all spills change and as a result
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little specific information exists to compare the efficiency
of skimmers to tank trucks. Because of a lack of guantative
comparisons a generalization of the advantages or
disadvantages of secondary firms using multi-functional
equipment would be impossible to verify. But the
possibility that such differences might exist must be
recognized.
2« Solution of the Pure Firms
Unlike the secondary firm which does not have to
rely solely on revenue from clean-up, the purs firm by
definition is much more concerned with clean-up revenue.
The pure firm cannot adopt too long term an approach to
revenue distribution, as it would be difficult to operate
from period to period on the presupposition that sufficient
revenue will eventually materalize.
One pure firm in the industry is an independently
incorporated firm privately owned by three other marine
related companies. Although an undefined exchange of
expertise and cost advantages exists from the owners to the
clean-up firm, there is no financial support by the owners
to compensate the firm for fluctuating demand. Another of
the pure firms is a separate financial division of a much
larger marine oriented company with an independent
requirement to generate sufficient revenue. Continued
operation of these two pure firms is very much dependent on
the demand for oil spill clean-up, plus any additional
functions or sources of income which would spread the risk
of random demand.
A discussion of the pure firm should determine
whether demand for clean-up service is predictible and large
enough to support a completely pure firm at an effective
level of operation. Low level demand would be sufficient to
support a clean-up firm only of such small size that the
basic economies of scale within the clean-up operation could
not adequately be exploited. Although there is no minimum
limit set on the size of the firm, a clean-up activity would
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as minimum have to support a manned response of containment
and clean-up capability. For a pure firm with no other
functions this might require at least two men available full
time and a minimum amount of equipment to contain and pick
up oil.
The data presented in Table 3 (page 28) can be
analyzed to determine both the random nature and magnitude
of demand. Figures 3, 4 and 5 are graphical representation
of the quarterly activity for each qeographical region over
the ten quarters of the study. This data in Table 3-A and
Figure 4 has been smoothed by eliminating any spill in
excess of $35,000. For all three of the geographical regions
it can be seen that the aggregrate revenue from minor
clean-up is not as random as had orginally been
characterized. This suggests that demand for the clean-up
of minor spills is somewhat predictable but at a relatively
low level of activity. Rather than random demand, a better
description of the problem facing the pure firm might be
inadequate demand for oil spill clean-up. There isn't
sufficient clean-up demands for the $5,000 to $35,000 spills
to warrant a pure clean-up firm of adequate size to meet
these spills.
The situation is that the pure firm has the option
of gearing up solely for the small spills or perhaps
maintaining a slightly larger capability and anticipating
greater revenue on a larger spill if one should occur. It
should be noted that the secondary firm has the potential to
devote as much or as little of the multi-functional
equipment to spill clean-up as is required up to the limit
of the firm's equipment. The bigger the spill the more that
can be substituted from the primary activity. The pure firm
doesn't have this option. It must decide knowing (or even
not knowing) its market share of regional demand whether it
will attempt only to meet this predictable demand, or face
the uncertainty of a larger spill potential. Even in the
event of a larger spill, a pure firm with only the
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capability for a small market share could at least exercise
its limited clean-up capability in assisting on the large
spill. If such a firm does equip itself to clean up spills
of the $35,000 to $100,000 category, other ways must be
sought to cover costs if the larger spill doesn't occur.
Pure firms might develop some other function such as
pollution equipment sales, spill prevention and reduction
services, or even to solicit prepaid support from the
potential clientele in the form of subscriptions.
The level of activity at which the relatively
certain demand for spill clean-up exists is on the average
$100,000 for each firm per year. This is too low to sustain
arty sizable clean-up effort. One firm stated that to
maintain a rapid response capability of two men and a boat
year round would cost in excess of $90,000 for labor alone.
Thus it is questionable whether this low but certain
activity is profitable for a pure firm. As mentioned
earlier $100,000 a year extra business is considered
profitable by the the secondary firm with multi-functional
capability.
All three of the pure firms in the commercial sector
of the industry have been forced to seek other sources of
revenue so as to maintain a higher level of response. One
firm has diversified into the manufacturing of equipment,
not only to be used as materials in their own clean-up
operations, but also to be sold in the clean-up equipment
market. Two of the three firms were unable to diversify to
an extent which would provide sufficient revenue, so both
instituted variations of prepaid subscription systems to
assure adequate funds. A prepaid subscription system can be
equated to an insurance policy for companies which are
potential spillers. The basic purpose is to maintain a
viable clean-up effort in a region where an otherwise
uncovered potential for a spill exists. This works to the
benefit of those companies which might demand clean-up for a
future spill. It also works to the advantage of the
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clean-up firm. The revenue to the commercial clean-up firm
is no longer totally uncertain. The government also stands
to benefit from having a commercial clean-up service
available, since the government regulates clean-up by
violators as well as possibly demanding clean-up for
government-caused spills.
The presence of pure firms in an area does not imply
that complimentary firms such as the marine-industrial
cleaning firms are not also present. The size of any
complimentary firms which are in the same area as a pure
firm, however, is not sufficient to carry oil spill clean-up
as a profitable sideline function. Both pure firms turning
to clean-up subscriptions were originally founded under the
expectation of obtaining sufficient profits from clean-up,
however both found it impossible to maintain reguired
clean-up capability based on spill clean-up revenue.
In a region where a clean-up firm cannot be carried
by its own revenue, the firm can either be supported by
those in need of its service or allowed to go under. The
only alternative to those firms who stand to potentially
require clean-up assistance, yet would have to cover their
own clean-up at a greater cost and less effeciency if the
commercial firm folds, is to support its existence.
Subscription can be a commitment in the form of a
support payment by all parties who stand to gain from
clean-up. The amount is the difference between the
unprofitable revenue of clean-up at present demand and a
reasonable return of profit for the commercial firm's
investment. This amount can be shared in any form agreeable
to the sum total of firms in need of the service. Such an
arrangement would assure continuance of the clean-up firm.
The most common form of subscription in the
commercial sector is more than just a straight subsidy as
described above. It most often takes on the form of a
two-part tariff. In return for subscribing to the pollution
service, services when needed by a subscriber are received
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at a discount rate. Thus, depending on the size of the
subscription for the individual firm, the size of discount
and the severity of a spill incurred, the total cost of
clean-up to the subscriber even including the subscription
costs might well be less than the total cost of clean-up at
the non-subscriber rate.
Subscription as a form of prepaid clean-up is in two
respects an insurance transaction for the potential spiller.
First it assures or insures clean-up capability will be
available if needed. Secondly it insures costs of a spill
of considerable size or severity would be reduced by a
constant amount analagous to a coinsurance policy. An
alternative to subscription for the clean-up firm would be
merely charging higher prices to cover costs. This would
radically increase revenue when a spill occurred. Charges
consist primarily of those for equipment and labor. If
labor prices are charged in excess of a comparable rate for
marine oriented functions, the demander of clean-up would
substitute personnel where at all possible. If equipment
charges were excessive there would be a tendency either to
substitute less efficient equipment or avoid clean-up
altogether. The two-part tariff presently used by several
commercial firms is already charging a higher price. If
demand is insufficient even a higher price will not cover
costs. Subscription removes some uncertainty and thus
adequate clean-up is not totally dependent upon a sufficient
number of spills occurring in any one period.
Prepaid clean-up can also take a form different from
the straight subscription or coinsurance of the two-part
tariff. Presently one pure firm in the commercial sector
has combined a policy of prepaid clean-up and a fee for
service payment for pre-deployed containment system into an
insurance package. The customer pays a fixed fee every time
the containment system (in this case owned by the customer)
is deployed, but included in the charge of the fixed fee is
the guarantee of clean-up of any oil spill within the
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containment system up to a specified amount, normally
$10,000. The philosophy behind this arrangement of prepaid
clean-up rests with the fact -that containment is a major
portion of the clean-up. ft *&&&&' provides additional
revenue to the firm as a hedge against the uncertain market
demand for clean-up. The insured clean-up provision of this
policy is contingent upon tne purchase and deployment of the
system from the firm in the commercial sector. If such a
system is applied extensively to any market arsa it would
closely parallel insurance both in the execution and the
actuarial determination of rates.
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VI* THE PRIVATE SECTOR
In an attempt to examine the entire spectrum of clean-up
potential, an area of clean-up capability which must be
recognized is the private sector. This sector accounts for
the in-house clean-up effort developed by those firms in a
potential position to spill.
The private sector effects the clean-up industry in
three different respects. First, it is from this sector
that a portion of demand for clean-up originates. Secondly,
the firms in the private sector, by having developed a first
strike clean-up capability, provide additional clean-up
resources within the Oil Spill Clean-up Industry. The third
effect on the industry is the capability to pool equipment
from several firms in the private sector to combat a spill.
This sector does not attempt to market clean-up services
to other potential users. It is an in-house capability
primarily for the protection of the individual firm. This
relates -co the urgency of timing in clean-up. If immediate
clean-up action is taken then the chances of a thorough
clean-up are much greater with subsequent reductions in
clean-up costs and damage to the enviroment.
The development of private clean-up for firms was a
result of various factors. Some firms could not rely on the
commercial sector to handle all clean-up needs because of
lack of existing facilities or the distance of the firm from
existing facilities. Other firms chose to develop private
capability becasue of cost advantages. Firms with a high
potential for spillage could train company personnel and
utilize company purchased clean-up equipment, thus avoiding
excessive rental and labor charges if a spill occured. A
final reason for maintaining a private capaoility was the
fulfillment of government regulations. Effective 1 July
1974, firms handling petroleum products between two vessels
or a vessel and shore were required to maintain equipment or
have at their disposal adequate equipment for
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containment of oil should a spill occur. 8 The
availability of clean-up equipment enables these firms not
only to apply initial clean-up efforts in the event of a
spill, but also small spills could be cleaned up entirely
with company equipment, eliminating the need to call in
outside help.
The maintenance of private equipment and exchange of
equipment between firms in this sector makes the clean-up
potential of the private sector a significant portion of the
Oil Spill Clean-up Industry. A clean-up demand which might
have been met by the Commercial Sector is now in part being
met with the in-house capability of the private firms. As
more firms develop some minimal in-house capability, more
clean-up will shift from the commercial to the private
sector.
The size of the in-house clean-up operations for the
firm often depends on the vulnerability of the individual
firm to spillage. While all firms in the sector have
acquired the equipment for the first strike capability,
those firms handling larger quantities of petroleum product
often maintain an extensive private clean-up capability.
When firms in the sector incur clean-up requirements that
exceed their in-house capability additional clean-up
resources are immediately brought in from other sectors in
the industry. Size of the firm and individual management
preferences determines whether outside clean-up is
contracted to take over the clean-up with continued
assistance from the in-house capability, or whether outside
efforts merely augment the existing clean-up structure
within the firm. Major firms are prepared to handle most
any size spill and just expand their organization to bring
in additional equipment and personnel as necessary. Other
firms are prepared only to meet the first strike requirement




and then relinquish clean-up responsibility once their
in-house capability is exceeded.
A measure of relative clean-up capability for the
private sector would be of interest to compare this sector
to others in the industry. Technically any firm which
maintains clean-up equipment is included in this sector. To
totally identify the private sector is then an unrealistic
objective due to the large number of firms which have or
intend to have clean-up equipment in the near future.
Further some firms which have this in-house capability have
classified this as proprietary information.
To obtain an indication of the capability and magnitude
of the private sector, sixty firms were polled with the
questionaire enclosed as Appendix C. The intention of this
survey was not an attempt to accurately quantify the total
capability of the private sector so much as it was to verify
the relative aggregate strength of this sector's clean-up
capability. Utilizing returns from this questionnaire and
information collected elsewhere, a low estimation of
clean-up strength could be made concerning this sector.
Information as to the utilization of clean-up equipment is
unavailable in comparison to the commercial sector, as
revenue is not incurred from in-house clean-up and cost data
is not consistent. This survey disclosed that as a
conservative estimate 75,000 feet of various types of
containment boom is maintained by the private sector and is
valued at approximately $500,000. Such an estimate is based
on data of 61 firms documented through the questionnaire and
various contingency plans to have 66,000 feet of boom.
Such figures are incomplete and therefore inconclusive
as to an accurate account of the private capability, but
they do suggest that equipment presently maintained by the
private sector can safely be estimated to be in excess of
one million dollars. The share of total clean-up demand met
in-house by the private sector therefore is considered
significant within the industry. This material is
46

distributed in small lot sizes at well over one hundred
locations up and down the West Coast. While some of this
equipment might be available to be utilized on a large spill
away from the private firm, most of it is committed to
standby and sometimes even pre-deployed protection for the
individual firm. It therefore must not be concluded that
the private sector has 75,000 feet of boom which can
immediately contribute to a massive oil spill clean-up
effort. But for the individual firm this material
represents an internal first-strike clean-up effort for
small spills independent of the commercial sector. The
aggregrate effect of this small spill capability does have a
measurable effect on the overall industry.
Limited response of the questionnaire indicated that
over the two and one half year period 58 spills had been
cleaned up by private sector resources. For those firms
responding this would suggest slightly more than one spill
per year for each firm. At least a third of the responses
had no spill for any of the periods. The cost figure is of
little comparative value due to the numerous possible ways
of figuring cost. Considering the possible error in the
cost figure, the response indicated that with the exception
of one clean-up in excess of $100,000 the average cost was
$3,000, with the median cost closer to one thousand dollars.
Again even though these cost figures are not reconcilable
with the revenue figures of the commercial sector, The
utilization of private sector capability is indicated to be
quite low, as it is designed for use only within a single
firm rather than being offered to many companies on a
commercial basis.
The incentive for the private firm to maintain clean-up
equipment is the availibility of the ready-response
capability. It might be questioned why firms who need
clean-up for their own use do not expand and try to offer
clean-up on a commercial basis as well, thereby increasing
utilization of the equipment. At present there is no member
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of the private sector doing this. Private clean-up
capability is considered only a cost of doing business.
Compared to the total volume of business this cost of
clean-up equipment constitutes only a small part of total
expenses. High utilization of the equipment is not so much
a factor for private firms, as the maintenance of standby
capability. If the clean-up capability was expanded on a
commercial basis it might possibly jepordize the in-house
capability if on-site equipment were required on a large
spill elsewhere.
Due to the uncertain demand for external use it has been
easier to maintain clean-up as an in-house expense, rather





The non-profit sector was developed to fill a void in
existing clean-up capability in the industry, rather than to
compete with existing commercial firms. In 1967 in the wake
of publicity from the TOPREY CANYON incident the president
of" American Petroleum Institute, Mr. Frank N. Ikard
recommended that member companies of the API develop a
cooperative approach to the problem of oil spills and
clean-up. It was visualized that such cooperative
organizations would "function much as volunteer fire
departments do, and their mission would be to contain and
clean-up oil spills". 9
Even prior to this attempt by the API to encourage
cooperatives on a nation wide basis, several such
organizations were functioning on a local basis. New Raven,
Connecticut started a co-op in 1964 with the purchase of
containment and clean-up eguipment as well as the
development cf an emergency plan. ( In addition to firms in
a position of potential spillage, the New Haven Fire
Department was also an active member of the co-op. )
The major purpose of the cooperative is joint protection
against spills of such magnitude that commercial clean-up
firms or private response capability might not be able to
adeguately meet the demand. The probability of occurrence
for such large spills is so uncertain that no commercial
firm would be willing to invest in the required equipment
and organizational structure to meet this demand. Several
commercial firms suggested it was difficult to obtain
satisfactory returns from an $80,000 skimmer much less a
$400,000 investment thought necessary to even approach the
large spills adequately. The co-op then supplies clean-up
capability where the degree of uncertainty in demand
prohibits the commercial firm from continuing with
9 "0il Spill Clean-up Cooperatives", American Petroleum
Institute, February 1973, p. 1.
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protection. The co-op is a viable alternative to the
problem of inadequate supply of clean-up in the face of
uncertain demand. To carry the original analogy of the
"firehouse dilemma" one step further, a solution for those
who demand clean-up beyond the commercial capability is the
development of a volunteer "firehouse" organization where
members support an oil spill cooperative.
The concept of cooperatives can be considered a form of
insurance, much the same way as prepaid clean-up discussed
earlier. It is to the advantage of all firms who handle
large quantities of oil to have protection available to them
should a large spill should occur. As discussed earlier,
such protection is difficult to encourage in the commercial
sector due to the degree of uncertainty in demand for these
large activities. Individual protection on such a large
basis would be cost prohibitive. Cooperation with other
firms facing the same demand helps to spread the cost of
such protection and assures each company that protection is
available if needed. The possibility of two members
requiring the full capability of a co-op is remote based on
present utilization. Therefore several firms can jointly
purchase equipment and expertise that otherwise would have
to be maintained separately. The co-op allows protection at
a fraction of the cost.
The six cooperatives located on the West Coast have a
common purpose of unified protection, however there is no
centralized control over these cooperatives. As a result
they vary both in the extent of commitment and the
organizational structure.
One role of the cooperatives can be described as that of
a coordinator. This service exemplifies to some degree all
co-ops. At present one cooperative exists on the West Coast
where coordination is the sole function. Such coordination
brings together all firms which require clean-up protection
and provides a common exchange of information. Moreover, it
supplies an organization through which mutual assistance
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plans can be developed. One cooperative even provides a
coordination of purchases so all members can take advantage
of group discounts on clean-up equxpffier.i, Supervision on
the actual clean-up operations•^cd-T.d-.-.-ro-^e from the co-op
personnel but rather from a management team drawn from
member firms in the co-op.
From this basic coordinator role other functions are
often added to develop the co-op into an autonomous clean-up
agency supported on a non-profit basis by member companies.
One added function includes the purchase of equipment by the
cooperative, not by the individual members, to remain as
cooperative owned and controlled equipment. Operating
personnel for such equipment can be either drawn from the
member organizations or from a subcontractor. If sufficient
clean-up demand existed for the co-op, personnel could be
maintained full time as part of the co-op staff. This,
however, is not presently done on the West Coast.
Preference is most often given to a prime subcontractor for
operating requirements. Such a prime subcontractor is a
commercial firm but most often not a commercial clean-up
firm. The subcontractor normally has a contract to operate
equipment solely for the co-op rather than offer clean-up
services on the side. Of the six co-ops on the West Coast,
three have prime subcontractors which are not included as a
firm in the commercia Clean-up sector. Another has no prime
subcontractor but rather numerous small subcontractors,
again not in the commercial clean-up sector. These four
co-ops provide supervision capability from within the member
firm on a pre-arranged volunteer basis.
If clean-up is conducted for a non-member firm these
supervisory services are charged at cost. A final
development of the cooperative is the integration of
commercial and non-profit functions. One of the
cooperatives on the West Coast has adapted this integration
by choosing a member of the commercial sector as a prime
subcontractor. This enables the expertise and capability of
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the existing commercial clean-up firm to be applied to the
effort of the oil spill cooperative. In this case
supervisory as well as operating services are subcontracted
out. Also in this situation the commercial clean-up firm
maintains and operates all equipment during clean-up
operations. The co-op utilizing this approach is in essence
purchasing a package clean-up for its members. When the
commercial and non-profit functions are integrated the co-op
is complementary, not competitive with the existing
commercial sector. All that differentiates commercial from
non-profit clean-up is whether the commercial contractor is
required to incorporate co-op purchased material in
clean-up.
A clear difference between the activity of the
commercial firm and the activity of the firm as a prime
subcontractor for the co-op is difficult to ascertain with
the integrated firm. Member firms in the co-op still
support the co-op on a pro-rated basis. The clean-up
equipment which has been purchased by member assessments is
turned over to the prime subcontractor who operates it for
the co-op. If a member firm is in need of clean-up, the use
of the co-op purchased equipment would not be charged to
him, and the other costs of materials and labor would be
charged at a pre-arranged rate. Non-members wouli pay for
use of co-op purchased equipment as it would for other
equipment of the commercial clean-up firm. Revenue received
on the co-op equipment vculd help defray costs of the
equipment
.
A similarity is evident between the subscription or
prepaid clean-up of a company discussed in Chapter V and
co-op support. Theoretically the support of a commercial
clean-up firm by several companies desiring protection would
be no different than the same companies supporting a co-op
as members and the co-op in turn supporting a clean-up firm
through equipment and financial subsidy. The difference is
that a co-op allows member firms a direct say in what
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protection the region should have to facilitate oil
clean-up. These member firms jointly decide how their
support to a clean-up entity is utilized. It might also be
argued that a commercial clean-up firm would fulfill the
reguirements reguested by subscribing companies or stand to
loose subscription payments. The cooperative however
provides for the coordination of needs prior to support.
This leaves no guestion as to the type of protection which
will be offered by the co-op supported commercial firm.
No matter which format a cooperative takes, the
existence of the co-op provides the organization and
eguipment support to accomplish clean-up which might
otherwise not have been taken. The six co-ops have a
combined clean-up inventory in excess of $ 4 million with a
majority of that presently held by four of the co-ops.
Broken down into regions this accounts for $ 1.5 million in
the Northwest Region, $ 1.1 million in the Central Coast
Reqion and $ 1.5 million in the Southern California Region.
In total this $ 4 million investment includes eleven coastal
or harbor skimmers and approximately 25,000 feet of
containment boom.
A measure of clean-up activity for the co-op is not as
apparent as for a commercial firm. Clean-up costs are not
comparable for members and non-raembers because of the
different charge proceedures for co-op owned eguipment.
Further where the prime subcontractor is also the commercial
clean-up firm, it is impossible to determine the impact of
just the co-op activity. Thus information is not available
to develop accurate clean-up activity figures for the
Non-profit Sector as a part of the Oil Spill Clean-up
Industry
.
Available data for the cooperatives does, however,
demonstrate an important fact. Clean-up activity on any
scale for the cooperative for the two and one-half years
under consideration has been very low. One of the larger
cooperatives operating under a prime subcontractor other
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than a commercial clean-up firm had experienced nine
clean-up operations in the two and one half years of the
study. Of the total clean-up charges, incurred by the costs
of the co-op and subcontractors, -uir.'rl;, nine percent of the
costs involved only two spills. These two spills involved
firms which were not members of the co-op. The remaining
spills of which only six involved members of the co-op were
very small. In addition on several other occasions advisory
services were made available at no cost. Another large
co-op reported no clean-up costs incurred at all in the two
and one half years. This co-op did however loan eguipment
to at least one spill not in its area of responsibility as a
back-up measure. For the first six months of 1974 less than
ten spills could be documented which were acted on by the
West Coast co-ops. The total cost was less than $100,000
with over 90 percent attributed to one spill by a non-member
of the co-op. In 1973 the co-ops cleaned up fewer than five
documented spills, with one moderate spill, the Oakland
Estuary Spill accounting for over 90 percent.
Orginally the non-profit sector was introduced to
demonstrate an alternate source of clean-up in the face of
demand which was not being met by the commercial sector.
The capability of clean-up for the co-ops has been
demonstrated to be large compared to the commercial sector
but the utilization has been guite small. This can be
primarily attributed to the purpose of the cooperatives,
that of providing protection in the event of the large
spill. During the time frame of this study, only three
moderate and no major spills have occurred. Aditionally,
co-ops were founded and developed within this two year
period, with much of the major clean-up eguipment having
just been received in late 1973 or 1974. Fven with this low
utilization of the co-ops to date, it is only through the
support of such co-ops that equipment can be brought




Future plans hold the possibility of a seventh co-op
being established in the offshore area of Southern
California in connection with the proposed offshore oil
leases. This co-op, named the Outer Continental Shelf Co-op
(OCS Co-op) is being strongly considered by companies
contemplating operation in the offshore area. Whereas other
co-ops generally pro-rate support by the vulnerability of
the individual members, this non-profit clean-up entity
would divide the support evenly among all members for
initial establishment and then pro-rate costs after offshore
activity is in operation. The first year budget alone is
expected to be in excess of $ 4 million. The OCS Co-op
tentatively plans to purchase three ocean skimmers larger
than any equipment presently on the West Coast. Two of the
skimmers would be 86 feet in length, have a 200 barrel
capacity and cost $ 1.5 million each. The third would be
108 feet in length and cost $ 2.3 million. The combined
total of these three skimmers would exceed the total value





The Oil Spill Industry is influenced both by the
government's demand for clean-up and supply of clean-up
capability. Since government facilities and ships are a
potential source of oil spills there exists a demand for
clean-up in the event of a spill. The Federal Government
also has the responsibility to provide for clean-up of
certain non-government spills. Such responsibility exists
where proper clean-up action has for one reason or another
not been taken. Limited in-house clean-up equipment is
maintained by the government, primarily by the Navy, to
respond to spills from government vessels. Further the
government maintains some specialized clean-up capability
with the Coast Guard Strike Force for incidents where
adequate clean-up of spills from both government and
non-government sources might not otherwise be available.
Even though the government is both a demander and supplier
of ciean-up. it does not attempt to provide government c^r.2d
clean-up capability to meet all potential government demand.
It must rely to some extent on the Commercial and Non-profit
Sectors for clean-up. Because of this overlap the Public
Sector must be discussed as a part of the Oil Spill Clean-up
Industry
.
A« GOVERNMENT CLEAN-UP DEMAND
Of initial interest is the extent to which government
demand for clean-up has supported the other sectors of the
industry. Government requirements for clean-up of in-house
spills have primarily been due to the Navy, Coast Guard and
other government owned vessels located on the West Coast.
Navy vessels and facilities in the past have relied heavily
on the commercial firms for clean-up, but since 1970 have
been adding government-owned equipment. At present the
extent to which the Navy relies on commercial contracts
varies with the individual Naval activity. The best
available data gathered by the author indicates that

clean-up contracts for all of the West Coast Navy activities
totaled $258,000 for 40 clean-up incidents in 1972, $330,000
for 45 incidents in 1973, and $90,D\Ju :of 13 incidents in
the first six months of 1974. A scjoiit^ of these spills
were minor with the exception of one moderate spill in 1972,
four moderate spills in 1973, and one in 1974.
The purchase of commercial clean-up for spills other
than from government sources is authorized by the Coast
Guard. The Coast Guard has the responsibility to respond to
spills of an unidentified source or where ths spiller will
not or cannot assure adeguate clean-up. Such spills are
financed from the Revolving Fund of $20 million ($35 million
authorized) to be administered by the Coast Guard. 10 If the
spiller is known, reimbursement to the Revolving Fund is
sought. Reimbursement it not always obtained, however, due
to several exceptions and a limit of liability which can
apply. The Coast Guard authorized and finances the clean-up
of such spills most often through the Commercial Sector
although on some moderate spills the Non-profit Sector has
been contracted to coordinate clean-up. In at least one
state payments from the Revolving Fund are occasionally made
to a state agency which in turn contracts with a commercial
firm to conduct clean-up. It has been the practice not to
utilize government clean-up eguipment or personnel on spills
where adequate commercial clean-up is available.
Had it not been for expenditures through the Revolving
Fund, a number of spills would have gone unattended.
Revenue and clean-up activity in the Commercial Sector also
would have been diminished. The government by including
this additional category of unclaimed spills has therefore
contributed to the commercial revenue. It also has depicted
a more accurate demand for clean-up within a time period by
^Wallace, Captain S. A.. U. S. Coast Guard, "U. S.
Coast Guard Environmental Protection Program", Navy Oil Spill
Control Conference, 1-4 Kay 1972, p. 26.
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attempting to include all spills. Even so there is little
dispute that some spills which could be cleaned up go
undetected. The extent of government clean-up through the
Revolving Fund is presented in Table 4-A. Only a negligible
portion of the Revolving Fund expense, except for the one
spill specified, went to firms other than in the commercial
clean-up sector.
The total clean-up activity administered by the Coast
Guard through the Revolving Fund for 1972, 1973 and the
first six months of 1974 represents a sizable contribution
to the commercial sector. The percentage of contribution by
the Revolving Fund to total commercial clean-up is presented
in Table 4-B. Although this contribution fluctuates from
period to period, an average contribution of the Revolving
Fund is 10 percent.
B« GOVERNMENT CLEAN-UP CAPABILITY
Clean-up equipment is owned by the Navy for use on
in-house spills. Navy equipment is located on the West
Coast through out sixteen different locations in the three
Naval Districts. In total this equipment includes
approximately 37,000 feet of containment boom valued at
$300,000 and ten harbor skimmers valued at approximately
$200,000. This equipment is intended primarily for clean-up
of Navy spills at the location of storage. This includes
eight thousand feet of boom and three skimmers which are
maintained by NAVSHIPS (SUPSALV) for offshore clean-up and
salvage not only for the West Coast but for the Pacific
Basin.
Documentation of the utilization of Navy owned equipment
is not readily available. Clean-up costs to the Navy are the
only figure which will give an indication of eguipment
utilization. One Naval District had complete cost data for
the first six months of 1974. During that time period there
were 134 spills reported or sighted within the area of
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enough to warrant any clean-up action. A cost figure based
on manpower and material for these 63 spills was estimated
by the Navy at $10,782. Although such limited data is
insufficient to draw any definite conclusions of the
in-house government clean-up activity as a share of the
total industry, it does verify that Navy clean-up effort is
directed towards small spills such as tank overflows and
bilge pumpings. Partial data observed from the other two
Naval Districts confirms the development of the small spill
clean-up capability. The Navy then is developing a first
strike clean-up force comparable to that of the Private
Sector. Inefficient or inexperienced clean-up personnel may
be reflected in much longer clean-up times and higher costs.
The Coast Guard maintains a clean-up capability not
directed at its own potential to spill but rather towards
those spills where the clean-up capability of the private,
commercial or non-profit sectors might not be adequate. The
Coast Guard Strike Force, headquartered for the West Coast
in San Francisco, is capable of responding anywhere in the
West Coast or even in the United States to a moderate or
major spill where other sectors of the industry are unable
to respond.
The Strike Force presently has assorted equipment valued
at $650,000 for use in clean-up response. This includes
speciality items such as 1800 feet of high seas containment
boom, and seven ADAPTS, high-capacity pump sustems for
removing oil from a stricken vessel. A recent example of
the Strike Force capability was in August 1974 when the
METULA, a supertanker carrying enough petroleum to supply
one tenth of the U. S. daily consumption, ran aground in the
Straits of Magellan. Although 50,000 tons was spilled into
Chilian waters, the Coast Guard's use of an experimental
system to remove the remaining 1,140,000 tons from the
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disabled ship, "kept it from beccmming a major disaster in
the view of environmentalists and shipping officials." 11
For the two and one half year period of this study, the
Strike Force responded to twelve different spills. These
spills were of moderate size and larger, or they constituted
a
.
specific situation where government assistance was
required. Six of these spills did not require actual
government assistance in clean-up, the only role was to
monitor clean-up operations. The other six spills, however,
involved government equipment and personnel as a part of
clean-up. Once again no specific measure of cost exists
which can be related to revenue consistant in the commercial
sector. Government costs charged directly to these six
spills totaled less than $50,000. Such figures as a measure
of activity are completely misleading due to the many
aspects of government clean-up not charged directly. As an
example in one spill attended to by the Strike Force, three
thousand feet of boom was employed for 14 days. Government
costs amounting only to damage of the boom totaled $7,000
while rental costs on a commercial basis would have
approached $42,000.
No comparable indicator as a measure of clean-up
activity exists for the Strike Force. Yet since the
government is not directly competing with any other sector,
such a comparison is not essential. Rather than
competition, the Strike Force provides a specialized
clean-up force supplementary to the other services available
throughout the industry.
One additional source of clean-up is the equipment
purchased through commercial channels and stockpiled by tne
Coast Guard. This equipment is located in seven different
areas on the West Coast where effective industry or co-op
organizations or company owned resources do not exist. This
n "Tanker Spill Stir s New Concern", Monterey, Peninsula
Herald, (Washington Post Service), 0cto5er~2B, 1974", p. 2.
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equipment is also supplementary in nature to the other
sectors, but is available for quick response in remote areas
should a spill occur. This stockpiled equipment is not
designated for use by the Strike Force, but rather by any
agency or firm in need of equipment. Stockpiled equipment
is. valued at $70,000 and includes 9,700 feet of asorted
containment boom. No utilization figures were available on
this stockpiled equipment.
The presentation of any cost data for government
clean-up must be qualified. Even costs based on manpower and
material are subject to wide variation between government
facilities. Cost of military personnel are calculated at
military pay rates, which differ from commercial pay scales.
One additional factor is personnel efficiency. Government
clean-up efforts benefit from other government resources not
intended specifically for oil spill clean-up. Government
small-boats help with clean-up while aircraft assist in
surveillance at either no charge or a rate different than
comparable commercial services.
O OTHER GOVERNMENT INFLUENCES
To date the government influence is primarily through an
in-house capability to clean-up its own spill or to assist
beyond the capacity of the various sectors. It might be
questioned that if uncertainty is really a dilemma, then why
should government not maintain a massive clean-up capability
just as municipal governments maintain fire protection.
In the past both California and Washington State have
proposed the establishment of a "barrel tax" from two to
five cents per barrel of petroleum. 12 Such a tax would have
enabled these states to have financed not only an extensive
enforcement program, but also a clean-up capability.
12 California State Senator Nedjedly, Contra. Costa
County, proposed a barrel tax for California in 1971.
Washington s'cate Department of Ecology proposed a siailiar
tax for Washington in 1973.
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Neither of the proposed taxes were ever passed. One
reason suggested by several persons for the failure of the
California tax was the development oi a non-profit clean-up
capability by the petroleum industry. At present government
maintance of extensive clean-up equipment for all spills




IX» INTERACTION OF SECTORS IN THE INDUSTRY
Just as an examination of the economics of oil spill
clean-up must include the various sectors of the Oil Spill
Clean-up Industry, so too must the interaction between these
sectors be considered. No interatction occurs where
clean-up services are required by a party outside the
industry. However when firms from the various sectors of
the industry work together on a spill, such as a commercial
firm subcontracting for a co-op, then an overlap in the
total clean-up activity must be recognized.
A* OVERLAP OF SECTORS
A non-profit firm can assume the role as a coordinator
of subcontractors and private sector firms in addition to
providing clean-up with co-op equipment. Likewise the
government can finance a clean-up which is carried out by a
co-op or commercial clean-up firm or even both. With such
interaction there exists the possibility that reported
clean-up activity from one spill might be duplicated within
the various sectors. A summation of activity of all sectors
would exaggerate the total clean-up effort expended. A
recent spill can be discussed to demonstrate this fact.
1 • Oakland Es tuary Spill
On 18 January, 1973 appromimately 171,000 gallons of
waste oil was dumped into the Oakland Estuary from storage
tanks. The bulk of clean-up lasted seven days and reached a
total cost of $ 1.2 million. 13 The clean-up of the spill
was financed entirely by the Federal Government through the
Coast Guard Revolving Fund. The Coast Guard activated the
Strike Force and available government-owned equipment, but
contracted the major task of clean-up to the local
cooperative, Clean Bay, Inc. The co-cp in turn activated
its clean-up capability but also contracted out
13Clean Bay Inc., Cleaning Up the Oakland Estuary
Spill, January 19 - 26, 1973, p. "T.
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operation of co-op owned equipment and many other tasks. In
total this clean-up operation involved 12 government
agencies (six federal, three state, and three municipal),
two private agencies, 48 contractors (only three of which
were a part of the commercial clean-up sector) , and the one
co-op with 10 member companies.
An overlap of clean-up effort could become quite
entangled in such an example. Of the total cost of clean-up
paid by the Federal Government, approximately 75 percent was
channeled to the co-op. The other 25 percent was paid
directly by the Coast Guard to private contractors, other
government agencies involved in the spill, as well as direct
payment of claims. Of the total clean-up cost the three
firms of the commercial clean-up sector received less than
33 percent. Non clean-up firms such as construction
contractors adapted themselves for clean-up on a short term
basis and one such firm accounted for just under 10 percent
of the total cost. This is a distribution of total costs
that is not at all uncommon for other moderate or even large
spills.
B« COMPLIMENTARY RESOURCES OF SECTORS
Another form of interaction is the complimentary nature
of the clean-up resources when equipment from several
sectors is combined. The non-profit firms often hold a
different type of inventory than the commercial firms or the
government. The larger equipment of the non-profit
organizations often needs the smaller capability of
commercial firms to compliment the entire clean-up effort.
The existence of such complimentary action strengthens the






At the onset of this study i± wa^ .assumed that the
occurance of oil spills was random and therefore
unpredictable. The purpose was to determine to what extent
the clean-up firms do operate in a "firehouse dilemma" of
uncertain demand, and then to seek to understand their
solution for contending with the problem. The discussion of
the industry required that commercial firms, which must deal
with demand uncertainty while seeking revenue, be
differentiated from other sectors where clean-up is not
explicitely profit oriented.
After examining gross revenue from clean-up as a measure
of past activity for commercial firms, it appeared that for
the three geographical areas total revenue from clean-up did
display uncertainty over time. It also became evident that
the clean-up industry is faced with a two part demand; minor
and catastrophic spill clean-up. Commercial firms have
concentrated their supply of clean-up capability towards the
minor spill due to the high cost for large-scale equipment
required on the moderate and major spills. This has not
precluded the commercial firms from contributing on the
large-scale clean-up incidents, but they are able to
contribute only up to the limit of their capability rather
than conduct the entire clean-up of the larger spills.
The study disclosed that the impact of demand
uncertainty is not the same for all firms because the
dependence of commercial firms on clean-up activity as a
source of revenue varies with the firm. The commercial
sector was divided into the pure firms, those highly
dependent on clean-up, or the secondary firms where oil
clean-up activity constituted only a small portion of total
operations for the firm. During the period covered by the
study, a trend was observed for increased dependence on
other than clean-up activities by all but one firm. For
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those firms originally heavily dependent on clean-up this
shift was toward clean-up related activities.
Of particular significance in the study was the
compilation of recent data concerning the Oil Spill Clean-up
Industry. It was determined that the nine firms shared a
2.4 million-dollar-per-year- industry. Although the data
for the first six months of 1974 suggested an upward trend
in the commercial sector activity, the uncertain nature of
clean-up prevents any prediction of how much growth, if any,
will take place in the commercial sector.
Other trends of the study showed an increased capability
on the part of the private sector and the government for
in-house clean-up. Such increases in clean-up by the other
sectors imply that many small spills once serviced by the
commercial sector are now going to be conducted in-house
rather than be contracted out. While the loss of a
government contract in one area was evident in the temporary
reduction in activity, a wide reduction in commercial
activity is not yet evident.
After examining the increased in-house capability within
the industry, a premature conclusion might suggest the
commercial sector is being replaced by the private,
non-profit or public sector. Conversely, however, this
author concludes that much of the new in-house impact will
enable many spills previously not cleaned up now to be
serviced. Instead of a time delay for commercial equipment
to arrive on scene, private equipment can immediately be
utilized. It is further suspected that immediate
containment by the spiller will provide commercial
contractors more clean-up activity when they do arrive on
scene for spills that exceed private capability. This would
be true where more oil was immediately contained and
therefore subject to clean-up. The continued importance of
the commercial sector is still evident as a part of the Oil
Spill Clean-up Industry.
The oil spill cooperatives have been highly publicized
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due to the recent purchases of large scale clean-up
equipment. Further the Coast Guard Strike Force response
capability to potential disasters attracts considerable
attention. The non-profit area of clean-up is expected to
expand as suggested by the formation of the Outer Contiental
Shelf Co-op. Large scale clean-up from these two sources
will provide capacity that appears to be not forthcomming
from within the commercial sector. The "firehouse dilemma"
originally posed has been solved in the following manner. A
capability for clean-up of the large scale spills has been
met in a cooperative fashion by those industries who have
the potential to require such clean-up services. It appears
the commercial firms have chosen to specialize in the minor
and more predictable clean-up. The non-profit sector and
suscribers to commercial firms have provided an alternative
to the commercial sector which chose not to supply the large
scale clean-up under uncertainty. It is expected that
future clean-up capability for large scale spills will
continue to be provided by cooperatives, not from a
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12422 68th Ave N.E.
P.O.Box 548
Kirkland, Washington 98033
Western Pacific Salvage Division
Willamette Tug & Barge Co.





H & H Ship ServCes
Foot of Channel Street





Crosby & Overton, Inc.
1620 nest 16th Street
Long Beach, California 90813
Wm. H. Hutchison & Sons Inc.










18 Marina Center Building
Santa Barbara, California 93109
Petroleum Industrial Coastal
Emergency Cooperative (PICE)
555 £. Ocean Blvd., Suite 510
Long Beach, California 90802




2416 North Marine Drive
Portland, Oregon 97217
Clean Sound
2406 13th Avenue S. W.
Seattle, Washington 98134
Clean Bay Inc.





























item rl 2 above
2. Costs of
your cleanup




in item # 5
above
Part III
1. No. of oil skimmers of following type: Ocean #
Coastal
Harbor
2. Amount of boom on hand
3. Dollar value of total cleanup equipment inventory $._.
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West Coast Oil Spill Incidents
197 3 by noirlf
(Data for Fi>j.'ir<s1J *
West Coast Total
jan 50 56 90 196
feb 50 53 105 196
apr 67 37 110 214
may 105 54 121 280jun 103 66 111 280
Jul 77 66 91 234
aug 75 40 121 236
spe 94 64 126 284
oct 107 53 114 274
nov 83 76 124 283
dec 81 51 128 260
Total STPT U6"D" . 13?U~ 2937"
source: Department of Transportation, U.S. Coast Guard
unpublished data.
West Coast Oil Spill Clean-up Incidents
1973 by month
(Data for Figure 2)
jan 9 14 17 40
feb 11 18 16 45
mar 16 7 19 42
apr 10 8 20 38
may 9 10 20 39
jun 18 11 22 51
jul 5 5 16 26
aug 8 11 18 37
sep 14 15 19 48
oct 13 12 19 44
nov 10 11 18 39
dec 16 9 20 45
Total "T39" T3T~ 22W ^IT
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